The objective values are those that exist outside the individual, regardless of perception or beliefs. This way of understanding values is typical of the axiological current called objectivism.
According to this current, value judgments are, in a sense, objective. Objectivism affirms that something is valuable without needing to be valued. The objects are independent of the knower or the person.
They are also independent of subjective tastes, attitude, preferences, interests, knowledge, and other factors.
In this sense, values and norms reside in objects or objective reality, as do colors or temperatures. According to objectivism, values are based on reality.
Theory of objective values
Great philosophers have defended axiological objectivism, among them Plato, Aristotle, and Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Plato, for example, argued vigorously for objective values like truth, goodness, and beauty.
His ideas contrasted with those of the relativists. For some relativists, truth and goodness were notions relative to cultures. Others affirmed that the truth of a judgment depended on the perception of the individuals.
Now, one of the thinkers who made the most contributions to the theory of objective values was the German Max Scheler.
The main argument of his theory is that the value of an object is preceded by perception.
That is, the axiological reality of values exists before knowledge. Therefore, the values are objective, immutable, a priori and not formal.
In this way, values can only be felt, just like colors can only be seen. Scheler believed that reason cannot think values, and that the mind can only organize values in a hierarchy after they have been experienced.
Values were independent of the things that made them feel. As a consequence, a particular value could be experienced with a variety of objects.
In this way, all experience already has a latent value. An object of perception like an oak tree is not only green or large, it is also pleasant, beautiful and magnificent.
Objects of experience are carriers of values. Thus, historical artifacts have cultural values, while religious icons have the value of "the holy."
Objective values and subjective values
Those who defend the subjectivism of values affirm that nature has no value in itself. It only has value when it is related to the assessment of the subjects.
Values, then, are built into what the valuation does. For objectivists, on the other hand, value is independent of the valuation, opinions or interests of the subjects. This depends on the intrinsic and qualitative nature of an object.
However, some thinkers try to overcome this dichotomy between the objective (absolute) and the subjective (relative).
They argue that values have a non-dichotomous means / end relationship. Thus, values such as freedom or well-being can be both a means and an end.
The objective-subjective distinction is maintained with the qualification that some desires, although they are subjective experiences, are objective values rather than mere whims; An example of this may be the desire to be useful and improve knowledge.
Themes of interest
Types of securities.
Human values.
Antivalues.
Universal values.
Sociocultural values.
Moral values.
Spiritual values.
Aesthetic values.
Material values.
Intellectual values.
Instrumental values.
Political values.
Cultural values.
Hierarchy of values.
Priority values.
Transcendental values.
Objective values.
Vital values.
Ethical values.
Priority values.
Religious values.
Civic values.
Social values.
Corporate values.
References
- Oregon State University. (s / f). Plate II: Objective values. Retrieved on November 30, 2017, from oregonstate.edu.
- Handoyo, PE (2015). Exploring Values: An Analytical Study of the Philosophy of Value (Axiology). East Rutherford: Book Country.
- New World Encyclopedia. (s / f). Max Scheler. Retrieved on November 30, 2017, from newworldencyclopedia.org.
- Davis, Z. and Steinbock, A. (2016). Max Scheler. In EN Zalta (editor), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved on November 30, 2017, from plato.stanford.edu.
- Vilkka, L. (1997). The Intrinsic Value of Nature. Atlanta: Rodopi.
- Bunge, M. (2012). Treatise on Basic Philosophy: Ethics: The Good and The Right. Philadelphia: Springer Science & Business Media.